Abstract-Aiming at the problem of large overhead and low accuracy on the identification of obfuscated and malicious code, a new algorithm is proposed to detect malicious code by identifying multidimensional features based on ReliefF and Boosting techniques. After a disassembly analysis and static analysis for the clustered malicious code families, the algorithm extracts features from four dimensions: two static properties (operation code sequences and bytecode sequence) and two features (system call graph and function call graph) which combines the semantic features to reflect the behaviour characteristic of the malware, and then selects important feature vectors based on Relief. Finally, ensemble learning is carried out, and the decision result is boosted based on weighted voting according to accuracy for a different feature analysis. It has been proven by experiment and comparison that the algorithms have a much higher accuracy of the testing dataset with low overhead.
Abstract-Aiming at the problem of large overhead and low accuracy on the identification of obfuscated and malicious code, a new algorithm is proposed to detect malicious code by identifying multidimensional features based on ReliefF and Boosting techniques. After a disassembly analysis and static analysis for the clustered malicious code families, the algorithm extracts features from four dimensions: two static properties (operation code sequences and bytecode sequence) and two features (system call graph and function call graph) which combines the semantic features to reflect the behaviour characteristic of the malware, and then selects important feature vectors based on Relief. Finally, ensemble learning is carried out, and the decision result is boosted based on weighted voting according to accuracy for a different feature analysis. It has been proven by experiment and comparison that the algorithms have a much higher accuracy of the testing dataset with low overhead.
Index Terms-Malicious code detection, multidimensional features, Boosting, ReliefF
I. INTRODUCTION
With the rapid development of network interconnection and widely using computers and digital devices for almost everything in everywhere worldwide, the confidentiality and integrity of electronic information is increasingly under serious threats [1] . Information security grows to be an important research field with much more concern. The appearance and increasing of malicious codes cause immeasurable losses and difficulties for numerous commercial companies, government institutions and people's daily lives. Therefore, investigation and development of techniques of detecting malicious code gradually become an important research direction in the field of information security.
Existing methods of detecting malicious code include signature-based detecting, checksum approach, behaviour monitoring, characteristic code detecting, artificial intelligence based detecting, etc. Since they apply different theories, and result in different overheads, each has its own advantages and disadvantages. Concerning different types of detecting objects of malicious code, major studies of static detecting methods involve: Assaleh [2] extract n-gram from byte sequence of a program as an effective information to classify malicious codes and apply the classifying algorithm using K nearest neighbor to detect computer viruses. Canali [3] analyze the system-call graph of malicious codes and identify malicious codes on the basis of detecting threshold of graph nodes. KANG B [4] use the control flow graph of a program as its characteristic attribute, and describe malicious behaviors of programs with Linear Time Logic to extract API calls from PE documents, and judge malicious code by finding the degree of difference between the suspicious file's call sequence and normal API call sequence using a detection engine. Most existing researches are based on a kind of attributes, combine statistical methods and artificial intelligence based methods, and apply traditional n-gram extraction techniques. Because most software applies polymorphic and metamorphic techniques, traditional detection methods have a limitation that only achieves a low detecting rate on transformed codes. Moreover, dynamic detection techniques [6] - [8] need to conduct virtual execution of the codes in a virtual machine to get the corresponding execution behaviour and path of codes, which result in slow detection, overhead and extensive usage of resources. In obfuscated code identification, it is difficult to identify malicious code with lower system overhead, and improve the detection rate and the accuracy rate while reducing the false alarm rate. This paper presents a research on multi-attribute feature detection. On the basis of static feature analysis of malicious code family and the "behavioural" feature in static mode, we propose to select characteristic vector based on ReliefF, and carry out weighted voting according to accuracy rate, thus boost the detection rate of different classifiers of multidimensional features, and solve the problem of large overhead and low accuracy in malicious code detection, and then conduct ensemble learning through weighted voting. and finally give the results of obfuscated malicious code identification.
Our key contributions can be summarized as follows: (1) selecting feature vectors based on Relief, and improve the time and space efficiency of classification through feature dimension compression. (2) promoting detecting results based on Boosting, and performing weighted voting according to accuracy rates of different classifiers to improve recognition for obfuscated and malicious codes. (3) based on variable-length n-gram feature selection, carrying out expert voting to calculate frequency of a feature in order to improve traditional n-gram [9] and n-perm [10] segmentation and statistics methods.
The other parts of this paper are organized as follows: the second section provides some background knowledge about malicious code detection and feature selection and boosting. the Section 3 introduces important algorithms and the framework of obfuscated malicious code detecting method based on ReliefF and Boosting. in the Section 4, the algorithm is proposed and analyzed. the Section 5 contains experimental result verification and comparisons with other works. Finally, conclusion and outlook are given.
II. BACKGROUND KNOWLEDGE

A. Obfuscating Transform and Malicious Code Detection
Let P represent a program set and an obfuscating process 
If a program p is infected by a malicious code m, it is defined as m→p. If all programs, which are checked by a malicious code detector, are infected, the detector is said to be sound, in other words, there are no false positive tuples. If a malicious code detector can detect all infected programs, it is said to be complete, in other words, there are no false negative tuples. Its formal definition is as follows [11] . After each of the trainings, the weight distribution of training sets is updated on the basis of training results, and then, the sample weights are increased or decreased in conformity to weight strategy to make the samples obtain more concerns in the next iteration. In the next iteration, training is carried out according to the new sample weights. After repeating iteration for T times, a learning machine series is acquired finally. When testing, each learning machine has a particular weight. The final estimated value is acquired by weighted voting, as shown in Fig. 1 .
III. DETECTION FRAMEWORK FOR MALICIOUS CODE BASED ON SELECTING AND BOOSTING
The obfuscated and malicious code detecting framework, based on feature selection and classification boosting, consists of the following main steps: clustering the malicious code family samples. obfuscating transform every type of code families. disassembling and statically analyzing samples before and after obfuscation, and normal code samples. extracting specific attribute types of each sample to form training sets 1 , 2 , ⋯ ,
. out of each training set, select the first n` (n`<n) vectors based on ReliefF, to generate learning machine Sample training mainly accomplishes the following three procedures: disassembling and static analysis, feature selection and classifier construction, feature selection. On code to be detected, three steps are performed: disassembling and static analysis, feature selection, weighted voting for detection result. Main modules of the system are shown in Fig. 2 Before feature extraction, extracting object, i.e., feature type should be determined. Presently the extracted feature types include source character string, operation code, bytecode, API call, control flow graph, PE file header, etc. Execute obfuscating transform on code [12] : renaming obfuscating attack will affect the type name of the source code. adding useless predicate attack will influence API frequency and order. smooth control flow attack will affect the extraction of edges and vertexes of control flow graph. Therefore, using different attribute types to identify malicious code helps to enlarge the clustering feature change radius of malicious code families, and to enhance the resistance to attacks.
In this paper, we select attribute types according to the change rate of feature attributes before and after obfuscating transform, and the behavioural performance in static code analysis. Those feature types with maximum change rates before and after obfuscating transform are selected preferably. Change rate is calculated as
where k is the partition size of characteristic debris, is feature extracted from some feature type.
is the transformed code of P with retained semantics. Find the average of the change rate of the feature , 1 ∑ =1 , in obfuscating transform set, and find max (
among all attribute types. Two static attribute types are used in this paper, namely, operation code sequence (OperCode_Sequ) and bytecode sequence (ByteCode_Sequ) features after disassembling. Integrating "behavioural" features of program in static semantic analysis, system calls (System_Call) and function calls (Function_Call) are analyzed, in an effort to increase detection accuracy and reduce false alarm rate with low overhead.
Main functions and core algorithms of the three major modules of the framework i.e. feature extraction and classifier construction, feature selection, and result boosting based on weighted voting, are introduced below.
A. Feature Extraction and Classifier Construction
Feature extraction involves the four feature types mentioned above. First, disassemble the executable file with IDA pro [13] (if shelled, unshell it first). then extract the assembly code, analyze statistically various feature sets, and store in vector ( 1 , 2 , ⋯ , ). Feature selecting algorithms are as follows.
1) Variable-length n-gram feature extraction algorithm
The algorithm mainly accomplishes extraction and frequency statistics of operation code sequence and bytecode sequence. Using (opcode sequence, frequency) and (bytecode sequence, frequency) as characteristic vector, gather statistics of n sequences in each type of samples to form the training set R 1 and R 2 .
Use variable-length n-gram feature extraction to avoid splitting meaningful sequences. Considering two different sequences string1={push call xor mov xor pop}, string2={01 E8 B8 01 E8 B8 B8 01}, suitable breakpoints need to be found first, and continuous sequence between two consecutive breakpoints is an extracting feature. The expert voting algorithm is selected as our segmentation algorithm. To improve the frequency computation and feature generation, Trie data structure is adopted to implement the expert voting algorithm. Its basic principle is: denoting depth of Trie by d, read d-1 bytes as a sub-sequence each time in the byte sequence. Each sub-sequence is inserted into Trie. If this sub-sequence has not appeared in Trie, its frequency is set to 1. otherwise, if this sub-sequence already exists, add its frequency by one. Each node in Trie has two parameters, frequency (f) and entropy (e), where m is the number of subtrees owned by the parent node 0 , entropy of leaf node is 0, the frequency of a node in Trie is
The entropy of a node is
For instance, string2={01 E8 B8 01 E8 B8 B8 01}, when depth d=4, use the two experts (frequency and entropy) to vote on possible breakpoints, and give higher scores at breakpoints. After the slide window has traversed the whole string, some local maxima can be found according to the scores and corresponding positions are breakpoints. Consequently, the sequence splitting result of string2 is ((01 E8 B8) (01 E8 B8) (B8 01)).
When constructing classifiers, SVM algorithm is adopted for training learning. Every sample is a n-dimensional vector. Construct m secondary classifiers, where m is the number of types of malicious codes. then there exists ( 1 , 1 ) ⋯ ( , ) ∈ × {±1} . Find the optimal partitioning plane w•x+b=0 between the two types. The ith classifier decision function is f i (X). Use malicious code from type i as positive examples, and malicious code from non type i as negative examples. When training, to adjust the size of the sliding window, and optimize the objective function according to
With constraint ∑ =1 =0, Lagrange multiplier ∈ [0, ], where C is a positive constant. Decision function is defined as
The kernel function ( , ) satisfies Mercer condition, as an inner product of some transformed space. In training, use the radial base kernel function ( , ) = (−   | − | 2 2 ), where δ is an argument. Use quadratic programming to solve equation (5) , to find optimal Lagrange coefficient a. threshold b is found by solving equation (6) .
2) Extracting algorithm based on similarity of directed graphs This algorithm mainly accomplishes analysis and statistics of system calls (System_Call) and function calls (Function_Call). Calling graph reflects semantic characteristics of code to some extent. They differ only semantically, yet having similar structures of directed graph called. Use tuples (system feature graph, similarity) and (function feature graph, similarity) as characteristic vector, find the common subgraph of each malicious code family. then calculate the similarity between each sample and common subgraph of each malicious code family, to form training sets R 3 and R 4 .
Structure of a directed graph is a quadruple G = (N , E ,α , β ), where N represents node junction (n∈N ), E is set of edges. there exists E ⊆ N × N, and node n1→ n2 ∈E representing dependency of calls. α: N → S represents function to assign calls to nodes. β: E → T represents function to assign calls to edges. For each node, there is a precursor node n i . pre and a successive node n i . suc, and use n i . pre_num and n i . suc_num to represent number of precursor and successive nodes of node n i respectively. Assume y malicious code families ｛ 1 , 2 , ⋯ , ｝, and each family contains K samples.
Extract K directed graphs 1 ⋯ , and find the common subgraph ′ ,and ′ of the k directed graphs as the characteristic graph. Malicious codes of the same family enjoy a relatively large similarity, so there exists a common graph. while normal codes are greatly different, so it is impossible to extract common subgraph from the samples, thus, their similarity is set to 0. Match each sample's directed graph with all common directed subgraphs ′ (Feature graph). Suppose the node number of and ′ is _ = and _ = respectively, scoring function is defined as
same( ,
, indicating all precursor and successive nodes are identical.
( ,
, indicating all precursor and subsequent nodes are different.
( , ′ ): indicates precursor and subsequent nodes are partly identical, ∀ ，
. Define degree of similarity between two graphs as the ratio of common node number and maximum number of the two graphs, noted as parameter
is the node number of the maximum common subgraph, ∈ (0,1). The final classified type of each malicious code is the type of maximum similarity match.
In classification training, set similarity threshold, adjust it, until the classification result of every malicious code is obtained. The attributes of constructed the training set are now to be selected.
B. Feature Selection Based on ReliefF
In the above training sets 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , based on ReliefF, from n characteristic vectors in each group, select according to their weights the first 2 3 n attributes which play important roles in classification, and get the learning machine 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 after dimension reduction. Suppose w is the feature's weight vector need to be acquired, and diff ( , 1 , 2 ) represents the difference between instance 1 and 2 with respect to feature F, if the selected attributes are discrete, then
If the attributes are continuous, then , and sample x is determined to be in the family . If its integrated decision result takes the maximum value. Decision function is of the form:
IV. ALGORITHM ANALYSIS
A. Efficiency Analysis of Feature Selection
We now analyze the impact of attribute vector selection on time complexity. Assume y types of malicious code families, take k samples from each one type. the number of attribute vectors of training samples is n. after feature selection, vector number is ′ ( ′ < ). training time for a sample unit characteristic vector is t. Consider only the impact of vector set on classification efficiency, then the required time before characteristic selection is ( ) = ∑ ∑ 1
1
, and the required time after characteristic selection is ( ' ) = ∑ ∑ ′ 1 1
. We
in the experiment, hence the improvement of time efficiency owing to feature selection is
It is shown that, with the reduction of vector dimension, the time complexity decreases linearly. But the amount of malicious code families and samples in each family is large, so the coefficient of the decreasing function is also large, and the decreasing speed is high.
B. Analysis of Detection Accuracy
Based on boosting of weight ∝
1−
, we now analyze the impact of integrated learning of multiple classifiers on the detection accuracy. Firstly, we explain the reason to set weight value w i , and then we prove that the integrated learning based on this weight is superior to the single or double classifier approach. . From Pigeonhole Principle, we get We analyze the impact of different segmenting methods on detecting results, test respectively and compare the impacts of n-gram [9] and n-perm [10] and variable-length n-gram (in this paper) on classification accuracy. Adjust the value of the sliding window n=1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and trie depth d=3,4,5, to make training results satisfy the objective function in section3.1.1. In training, while the sliding window size increases, the accuracy rates of these three segmenting methods vary from small to large and then from large to small. Within the range, when selecting the optimal parameters (n=3, trie_d=4), these detecting data satisfying optimal objective function from Table 1 Detection r sults based on different segmenting meth od s （ n=3,tri 4） Table 2 (Thres and thre average efficiency of the detection algorithm of multidimensional feature to the other two singledimensional algorithms, OperCode_Sequ and system_call in Fig. 3 . Finally, the multi-dimensional test results compared with the existing anti-virus software , shown in the Fig. 4 after testing 850 samples (450 malicious code and 400 normal code). From the Table I , we find that, for an identical sequence, we get different number of feature sets. accuracy rate is improved, while the false positive rate is decreased. For malicious codes based on order obfuscating transform, identification rate of n-gram is the lowest. n-perm neglects order in statistics, thus collects less attributes, and it takes no account of some semantically related sequences, so its classification accuracy is affected. variable-length n-gram, which carries out unequal characteristic vector segmentation, integrating semantics of segmented sequences, and adopts expert voting in statistics, obtain relatively good results in discriminating features of malicious code families, and outperforms the former two. Table II , when changing the similarity thresholds of directed graph, the detection results first becomes large then small, although not in proportion to grow, but the detection result is preferably when the threshold value close to (0.7, 0.6).
From Fig. 3 , The detection results of multidimensional features have obvious advantages than test results of single attribute algorithm, but the training time and testing for a long time, in practice, should make a trade-off in terms of accuracy and efficiency. This algorithm has a high accuracy rate and a low false positive rate in detecting polymorphic malicious code， and can detect the obfuscated code that cannot be detected by the commercial anti-virus software (Norton, Rav2013) shown in Fig. 4 . For dynamic testing technology needed depth for the dynamic behavior of the software features, such as dynamic behavior algorithmc [7] , need executing the code in a virtual machine, need tracking code execution behavior and computing path, by comparing the test time, overhead and resource, as shown in Fig. 5 , the multi-features algorithm has obvious advantages.
VI. CONCLUSION
To solve the problem of low detecting rate in malicious code detection, this paper proposes a low-overhead method to improve the detecting rate. Using static analysis of codes and static "behavioural" characteristics, we identify obfuscated malicious codes by classification learning of malicious code families. This method improves classification efficiency by feature selection based on ReliefF, and increases detecting accuracy by weighted voting according to accuracy. consequently solves key problems in feature extraction, such as feature sequence segmentation and measurement of feature graph. It is an improvement of existing algorithms. In the next stage of research, we will apply clustering [14] and Rough Set to expand the selected range of feature types, and solve the problem of the correlation between features. additionally, combine existing static analysis and dynamic program slicing, and deeply analyzing and learning behaviours of malicious codes, so as to further increase the accuracy of detection. 
